Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional Framework by Christie, Mark C.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 3 Article 5
3-1-2006
Economic Regulation in the United States: The
Constitutional Framework
Mark C. Christie
Judge, Virginia State Corporation Commission
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Legislation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional Framework, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 949 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss3/5
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Mark C. Christie *
The United States of America is well-known (and occasionally
well-liked or loathed) as the world's largest free-market capitalist
nation. Indeed, many assume that since the United States for
more than two centuries has had an economic system based on
liberal principles, Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of capitalism
must have been embedded in the United States Constitution from
the beginning of the American republic.' Yet government at all
levels in the United States has historically exercised significant
regulation of economic and commercial activity-regulation in-
consistent with laissez-faire capitalism.
The purpose of this article is to consider several questions: (1)
what are the constitutional sources of governmental authority in
the United States to regulate economic activity?; (2) what are the
differences in regulatory powers between the federal and state
levels of government?; and (3) what are the limits on the regula-
tory powers of government in the United States? I should empha-
size that in this article I do not intend to advocate for or against
government regulation as the proper policy in any specific area;
instead, I intend to explore the circumstances under which regu-
latory policies chosen by policymakers are consistent with the
Constitution.
* Judge, Virginia State Corporation Commission; Visiting Professor, Center for Pub-
lic Policy, Virginia Commonwealth University. J.D., 1981, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.A., 1975, Wake Forest University. The views expressed herein are solely those
of the author.
1. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, the same year the
Second Continental Congress approved the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1930) (1776).
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I. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS AN ECONOMIC
DOCUMENT
Does the Constitution enshrine free-market capitalism-what
Europeans would call economic liberalism-as the economic order
of the United States?
This question has been a source of debate throughout much of
American history. In his 1913 seminal work, An Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States,2 Charles A.
Beard was among the first historians to allege that the Framers
of the Constitution were concerned about protecting their own
economic interests. One does not have to accept entirely Beard's
then-radical thesis to acknowledge that the Framers had obvious
economic purposes when they drafted the Constitution in 1787.
The protection of what was considered the natural right of indi-
viduals to own property was a key philosophical component of the
American Revolution, and, as prominent economic historians
Douglass North and Robert Thomas have noted, where capitalism
succeeded it was "in the main due to the type of property rights
created."3 Men of property, shocked at episodes such as Shay's
Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786, which was largely a revolt of
debtors against creditors, wrote the Constitution. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, added shortly
after ratification, explicitly protects private property from gov-
ernment confiscation without adequate compensation.4 The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 included another essential compo-
nent of a capitalist economy in the Constitution: the protection of
the legal enforceability of contracts between private parties from
governmental interference. 5
The French and Russian Revolutions were primarily about
equality-social and political equality in the French case and the
Marxist utopia of absolute economic equality in the Russian case.
2. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (The Free Press 1963).
3. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 46 (2003), citing DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973).
4. "[Ior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra Parts IV.B.-C.
5. The Contracts Clause states: "No state shall.., pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
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Whether the American Revolution was more about liberty than
the equality that Thomas Jefferson hailed in the Declaration of
Independence hag long been a popular topic among historians.6
Certainly for Jefferson and some radical revolutionaries, such as
Thomas Paine, the American Revolution was about democracy
and egalitarian ideals. There is no question, however, that the
Framers of the Constitution, at their convention in Philadelphia
eleven years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence,
were deeply concerned with protecting individual liberty-
including the liberty to own property-from governmental en-
croachment. Appalled by the actions of state legislatures during
the Articles of Confederation period, the convention delegates had
no intention of establishing a federal government with the power
to impose economic equality through the violation of individual
property rights.
On the contrary, James Madison, the brilliant "Father of the
Constitution," wrote in The Federalist No. 10 that in a free soci-
ety, "factions"-what we would call interest groups-would natu-
rally occur.
Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire.... But it could not be less
folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it
nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air,
which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its de-
structive agency.7
Madison believed that liberty creates the conditions for an un-
equal distribution of property:
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of prop-
erty originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of
interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of gov-
ernment. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of
property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division
of the society into different interests and parties.
8
Madison believed that liberty would produce economic inequal-
ity because of the "nature of man" and that "the most common
and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
6. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 99-106 (2002).
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Tudar Publishing Co. 1937).
8. Id. at 64.
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distribution of property," yet the protection of liberty was the first
order of government.9 Madison and the other Framers were not
utopians but realists who recognized the inherent conflict be-
tween liberty and economic equality-and they chose liberty.
Their belief in equality was limited to a sociopolitical equality in
which all citizens would stand equal in the eyes of the law, and
the aristocratic privileges of birth that characterized Europe's
monarchies would be abolished. There would still be an aristoc-
racy, but it would be a natural aristocracy based on individual
talent and work ethic, not birth, and characterized by an equality
of opportunity, not outcomes.
While the liberty the Framers intended to protect certainly in-
cluded the liberty to own private property and to conduct private
commercial affairs, did the Constitution enshrine laissez-faire
capitalism as America's constitutionally required economic sys-
tem? There has long been a strain in American constitutional his-
tory whether certain natural rights to economic freedom cannot
be impaired by the powers of government, regardless of whether
those rights are found in the text of the Constitution itself. That
natural-law belief, however, has never attained a permanent con-
sensus on the Supreme Court.10 The history of America has seen a
steady increase in the regulation of commercial and economic ac-
tivities by government, regulation that the courts have occasion-
ally limited or restructured but have rarely-and never perma-
nently-forbidden as inconsistent with a purported constitutional
requirement of laissez-faire capitalism. In his famous dissent in
Lochner v. New York,' Justice Holmes challenged the natural-
law advocates directly, writing, "a constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire."2
It is accurate to say that the Constitution protects a free-
market capitalist economic system to a significant degree, most
importantly by protecting private property and contractual
rights. These rights are essential to the functioning of a market
economy, but the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Con-
9. Id.
10. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
484-88 (12th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-1 to 8-7
(3d ed. 2000).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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stitution to require a completely unregulated, laissez-faire market
economy. The Constitution was not written by Ayn Rand, but in-
stead by James Madison and other practical politicians-
politicians who believed deeply in protecting individual liberty
and property from government tyranny, but who were also heirs
to the European Enlightenment belief that some degree of gov-
ernment regulation of human affairs was absolutely necessary to
lift humans from their natural state of anarchy.
II. WHAT IS THE FOUNDATION OF GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY
POWER?
To understand the sources of government's power to regulate
economic activities in America, we must first understand from
whence government itself came, at least as America's founders
understood it.
The United States Constitution-indeed, the United States of
America itself-is the product of the European Enlightenment
and its philosophy of government and the proper relationship be-
tween the governed, i.e., the people, and their government. The
American republic and its Constitution can accurately be de-
scribed as two crown jewels of the Enlightenment because they
embody Enlightenment principles applied to a new form of gov-
ernment which has not only survived, but thrived, for more than
two centuries.
Two of the most important Enlightenment philosophers in
terms of influence on America's founders were Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke.' 3 Hobbes, in his classic work Leviathan,14 wrote
that mankind's natural state of existence was that of a "war of
every one against every one."' 5 For their own self-preservation,
humans voluntarily contracted to form a government and give it
sovereign power to restrain men from harming each other. 6 Thus
one of the fundamental purposes of government, as America's
founders saw it, was to protect men from each other. This purpose
of government-to protect the public safety and good order-
13. Some historians consider Hobbes to be pre-Enlightenment, though he was never-
theless firmly in the Age of Reason.
14. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1958) (1651).
15. Id. at 110.
16. See id. at 139-43.
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provided the basis for what we call today in constitutional law the
general police power that is inherent in the sovereign, i.e., gov-
ernment.
John Locke, who more than any other individual was the intel-
lectual fountainhead of the republican experiment in America,
took a somewhat more positive view of the human condition than
Hobbes. Locke believed that human beings were born with natu-
ral rights to life, liberty, and property, and that human beings
would consent to live under a government that would protect
their natural rights.' Locke's view of a society based on ordered
liberty was not one of laissez-faire, but one in which government
had a proper role to play in exercising its police power for the pro-
tection of the citizenry's natural rights, especially the citizenry's
right to property. I"
Throughout American constitutional history, the police power
of government has not been narrowly limited to law enforcement
authorities fighting crime. Instead, the police power has been
generally construed to include the power of government to regu-
late economic activity as well. The Supreme Court, in its 1877
opinion Munn v. Illinois,9 described broadly the government's in-
herent police power in a challenge to rate regulation of grain ele-
vators by the Illinois legislature:
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with
some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his
relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," as aptly defined
in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a social
compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by cer-
tain laws for the common good." This does not confer power upon the
whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively pri-
vate, but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each
citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not un-
necessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government.
... From this source comes the police powers, which, as was said by
Mr. Chief Justice Taney... "are nothing more or less than the pow-
ers of government inherent in every sovereignty. . . ." Under these
17. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 167, 176 (The Classics of Lib-
erty Library 1992) (1698).
18. See id. at 261 ("The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting them[s]elves under Government, is the Pre[s]ervation of their Prop-
erty.-) (emphasis added).
19. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one to-
wards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own
property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public
good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time
immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regu-
late ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers,
innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be
made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles
sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon
some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been success-
fully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitu-
tional prohibitions against interference with private property. 
20
This is one of the clearest statements in Supreme Court juris-
prudence that the Founding Fathers, while passionate about the
protection of liberty and private property rights, did not intend to
enshrine laissez-faire capitalism in the Constitution. To do so
would have required them to eliminate Anglo-American govern-
ment's traditional police power, which, as the Munn Court
pointed out, had included forms of economic regulation for centu-
ries.
More specifically, the Munn Court stated that underlying the
historical basis for the use of the government's police power to
regulate economic activity was the concept of private property
that is affected with a public interest, which includes the common
carrier or natural monopoly. As described by the Supreme Court
in Munn:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community
at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an inter-
est in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good .... 21
The Munn Court cited examples from English law of private
property put to public use-for example, a river ferry.22 While the
ferry was privately owned, if it was offered for the use of the pub-
lic, it was properly regulated by government as to rates and other
conditions of operation for the protection of the people. The ferry
was a common carrier, but the rationale for regulating common
carriers also extended to natural monopolies:
20. Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 126.
22. See id. at 125.
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There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law
and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his
own property, or the use of it; but if for a particular purpose the pub-
lic have a right to resort to his premises and make use of them, and
he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the
benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the
duty attached to it on reasonable terms.
23
Common carriers and natural monopolies were private proper-
ties affected with a public interest and thus subject to govern-
ment regulation using its inherent police powers to protect the
public. The American legal and constitutional system inherited
this principle from English law, and it formed the basis for the
regulation of railroads and, later, trucking companies, buses,
streetcars, airlines, and public service corporations (e.g., electric,
gas, water and telephone utilities) in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries.24
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN AMERICA
To understand economic regulation in the United States, one
must also understand the American federal system. In terms of
the sources of regulatory authority, the federal and state govern-
ments in America are starkly different. The state governments
came into existence well before the federal government, and it
was the state governments that inherited the general police
power which was inherent in the sovereign under English law.
Again, the Munn Court described the history:
When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great Brit-
ain, they changed the form, but not the substance, of their govern-
ment. They retained for the purposes of government all the powers of
the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or
other forms of social compact, undertook to give practical effect to
such as they deemed necessary for the common good and the security
of life and property. All the powers which they retained they commit-
ted to their respective States, unless in express terms or by implica-
tion reserved to themselves.
25
23. Id. at 127-28 (quoting Aldnutt v. Inglis, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 206, 210-11 (KB.)
(Lord Ellenborough, C.J.)).
24. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 9-
10 (4th ed. 1999).
25. Munn, 94 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
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An example of the American states' inheritance of English law
upon independence can be found in the current version of the
Virginia Code.26 Two provisions state that both the English com-
mon law and the Acts of the British Parliament shall remain in
effect in Virginia "insofar as [they] are consistent with the Bill of
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth and the Acts of
Assembly."27
It was the state governments in America that inherited the
general police power to protect the public, not the federal gov-
ernment. The Framers of the Constitution intended the federal
government, which came into existence decades after the state
governments and their colonial predecessors, to have no general
police power and only have the specific powers listed in the Con-
stitution. Thus the state governments have frequently been de-
scribed as governments of plenary powers and the federal gov-
ernment only of enumerated powers.28 The difference is crucial to
understanding and respecting the American federal system; yet it
is sad how many Americans do not understand this important
distinction, especially Americans who become federal officehold-
ers.
IV. WHAT ARE THE LIMITS ON STATE GOVERNMENTS'
REGULATORY POWERS?
While state governments are governments of plenary powers
with broad authority under their police powers to protect the pub-
lic through regulation, those powers are not unlimited. In addi-
tion to any limits found in state constitutions, there are three
primary limits on state regulatory power found in the United
States Constitution: the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause,
and the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause."29
26. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-200 to -201 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
27. Id. § 1-201; see id. § 1-200.
28. See JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138 (7th ed.
2004).
29. I have not listed the Contracts Clause as currently an important restriction on
state regulatory powers. While it has flared up occasionally as a separate constitutional
limitation on state action, see, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234
(1978), in the modem era the Contracts Clause has largely been subsumed into Due Proc-
ess Clause jurisprudence.
2006]
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A. The Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause ° stands as a
limit on state regulatory powers over economic activities, but
whether it still represents a significant limit is questionable. It
was not always so, however, as the Due Process Clause was fre-
quently used in the past to limit state regulatory powers substan-
tially.
As discussed above, the Court in Munn v. Illinois justified the
regulatory powers of state governments on the historic English
legal principle of the sovereign's power to regulate common carri-
ers and natural monopolies.3 For the next several decades, the
Supreme Court often applied Munn by using the Due Process
Clause to strike down state regulation of private business on the
grounds that the type of business at issue was neither a common
carrier nor a natural monopoly and thus not a business affected
with a public interest.32 This "Munn doctrine" came to an end in
Nebbia v. New York,33 when the Court ruled that state regulatory
powers were not limited only to those businesses deemed to be af-
fected with a public interest.34
A broader use of the Due Process Clause to invalidate state
economic regulation took place between the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the 1930s. Using a so-called "economic due process" doc-
trine, the Supreme Court frequently struck down state laws on
the grounds that the end the state sought to achieve with its eco-
nomic regulation was itself illegitimate, regardless of the means
or process chosen to achieve that end. The emblematic case of this
era was, of course, Lochner v. New York,35 in which the Supreme
Court struck down a state law regulating the working hours of
bakers on the rationale that it violated a substantive guarantee of
contractual freedom between employer and employee which the
30. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rels., 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
33. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
34. See id. at 531-33.
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Court found implicit in the Due Process Clause.36 The Court's
opinion brought forth the famous Holmes dissent noted above. 7
Like other judicially imposed restrictions on state (and federal)
economic regulatory powers, the Lochner doctrine of economic due
process came to an end during the New Deal era. In West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish3' and United States v. Carolene Products,39 the
Court dispensed entirely with the Lochner doctrine and replaced
it with an extremely deferential standard of judicial review of
economic regulation by government, whether state or federal. The
new "rational basis" standard, which continues in effect, was
stated in Carolene Products: "where the legislative judgment is
drawn in question, [the Court's inquiry] must be restricted to the
issue whether any state of facts either known or which could rea-
sonably be assumed affords support of [the legislation]."a°
Today, only when the state has acted in a transparently arbi-
trary or capricious fashion to regulate private economic activity
will the Supreme Court use the Due Process Clause to invalidate
the state action. The question whether this standard represents
any real limit on state regulatory power may perhaps be an-
swered by observing that the Supreme Court has not struck down
a state law regulating economic activity on' due process grounds
since the 1930s.41
B. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which has been
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 2
provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
The Takings Clause does not prohibit the government from
taking private property. It allows the government to exercise the
36. See id. at 53, 64.
37. See id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
39. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
40. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
41. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 24, at 89-90.
42. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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power of "eminent domain" if two requirements are met: (1) the
taking must be for a public use, and (2) the property owner must
be paid fairly for his or her property.
The paradigmatic use of the Takings Clause is when a state
government uses eminent domain to seize privately owned land to
construct a highway or bridge open to all motorists. There is no
question as to meeting the public use requirement, and the only
real issue in such a proceeding is the adequacy of compensation
the government offers to the property owner.
The Takings Clause does not require that private property only
be transferred to governmental ownership. Throughout American
history eminent domain has frequently been used to transfer pri-
vate property to privately owned common carriers or regulated
monopolies. These private companies are affected with the type of
public interest discussed in Munn v. Illinois, and they function as
proxies for government itself because they provide a service that
the government deems in the public interest to provide. 44 Com-
mon examples of public service corporations include electricity,
gas, water, and telephone utilities. The classic example of a com-
mon carrier is a railroad. All have been heavily regulated as to
rates and terms of service at various times throughout American
history.
Since the late 1970s, there has been a strong deregulatory
trend put in place by policymakers that has seen railroads, along
with airlines and trucking companies, become largely deregulated
as to rates and terms of service. Within the past decade, several
states have attempted to restructure the electric power industry
to replace a regulated monopoly with a competitive market. A
major question in terms of the Takings Clause is whether the ra-
tionale for allowing a public utility to exercise the state's power of
eminent domain will still pertain when there is no longer a state-
designated monopoly provider but instead numerous competing
companies that are under no obligation to serve all customers
within a given service territory-as regulated monopolies histori-
cally have been required to do.
When eminent domain has been used for a public highway or
by a state-regulated public service corporation, there has been lit-
tle constitutional controversy. Major controversy occurs, however,
44. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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when the public use requirement is in question. In June 2005, the
Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion on that issue in Kelo v.
City of New London.4"
In Kelo, the economically depressed city of New London, Con-
necticut wanted to revitalize itself through a multi-use develop-
ment anchored by a new research and development center for the
pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc.46 New London's economic-
development plan also envisioned a new state park, a Coast
Guard museum, a waterfront conference center and hotel, restau-
rants, retail stores, new homes, and marinas.4
The problem for the city was that several property owners re-
fused to sell their homes to make way for the new development.4"
The city then sought to use the power of eminent domain to seize
the properties and transfer them to the city-designated private
developer.4 9
Previous uses of eminent domain for promoting economic de-
velopment approved by the Supreme Court usually involved
property that was either blighted itself (and thus a nuisance un-
der historic English common law principles adopted in the United
States) or part of a blighted neighborhood,5" or where the gov-
ernment alleged a distinct economic harm caused by an intensely
concentrated pattern of property ownership that eminent domain
was intended to cure.51 In Kelo, however, there was no allegation
that the property at issue was either blighted or part of a blighted
neighborhood. The city argued that the term "public use" in the
Takings Clause really meant "public purpose," and that economic
development-producing new jobs and higher tax revenues-was
a public purpose that met the constitutional requirement.52
By a narrow five-to-four margin, the Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained that the term
"public use" had expanded over time:
45. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
46. See id. at 2658-59.
47. See id. at 2659.
48. See id. at 2660.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
51. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984) (involving
the situation in which a large amount of land owned by a small number of landlords was
forcibly sold to tenants through use of eminent domain).
52. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-63.
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Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed
.use by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow
view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public"
test difficult to administer.., but it proved to be impractical given
the diverse and always evolving needs of society....
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether
the City's development plan serves a "public purpose." Without ex-
ception, our cases have defined this concept broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field.53
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, stressed that he
was confident that New London was not attempting to benefit one
private party at the expense of another because:
This taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive development
plan meant to address a serious city-wide depression .... The iden-
tity of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time
the city formulated its plans.... In sum, while there may be catego-
ries of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the proce-
dures employed so prone to abuse.., that courts should presume an
impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances are present in
this case.
54
In a scathing dissent by Justice O'Connor-one of her last ma-jor opinions before retiring-she began by quoting from one of the
earliest Supreme Court decisions, a 1798 case in which the Court
opined, "[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is
against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legisla-
ture with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it."5" O'Connor continued,
Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on gov-
ernment power. Under the banner of economic development, all pri-
vate property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded-i.e., given to
an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public-in the process. 56
53. Id. at 2662-63.
54. Id. at 2670-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798), quoted in Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671(O'Connor, J., dissenting).




Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private
party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate in-
fluence and power in the political process, including large corpora-
tions and development firms. As for the victims, the government now
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to
those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse
result. "[Tihat alone is a just government," wrote James Madison,
"which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own."
57
The Kelo decision brought a storm of criticism from politicians
and legal commentators.58 What is ironic is that Kelo simply
stated the obvious, that state and local governments have been
using the power of eminent domain under a broad definition of
"public use" for many decades, as Justice Stevens in his majority
opinion pointed out, citing numerous prior cases.59 The important
question, however, is not whether state and local governments
have long been using-and occasionally abusing-the Takings
Clause under the banner of economic development; the important
question is whether the Supreme Court has allowed the power of
eminent domain to be expanded far beyond the constitutional
Framers' intent, as Justice O'Connor alleged. In the Kelo case,
the Court had an excellent opportunity to define the "public use"
requirement of the Takings Clause in a balanced way, allowing
its proper use to benefit the public while protecting private prop-
erty owners from abusive and indiscriminate use by state and lo-
cal governments in ways that inure more to private benefit than
public good. The Kelo Court, however, failed to take this opportu-
nity. Instead it set forth a standard of review that is so broad as
to be essentially meaningless. It is hard to see how future courts
at any level are supposed to prevent the abuse of eminent domain
when a government claims its exercise is essential to economic
development and presents it as part of an apparently comprehen-
sive plan, such as comforted Justice Kennedy in his concurring
opinion."
57. Id. at 2677 (alteration in original).
58. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at A14.
59. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-65.
60. See id. at 2669-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
C. Regulatory Takings
Another important issue arising under the Takings Clause is
that of the "regulatory taking." Until the 1920s, the Takings
Clause was considered to be applicable only in the paradigmatic
case of direct government expropriation of private property. In
the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon61 in 1922,
however, the Court established the concept of a regulatory taking.
In a regulatory taking, title to the private property is not trans-
ferred to the government or another private party. The original
property owner still holds fee title to the property. The govern-
ment, however, through regulation so impacts the owner's right
to use his or her property, or so diminishes its fair market value,
that the regulation is held to be a de facto taking and a constitu-
tional violation.62
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has found regulatory tak-
ings in several contexts: first, where government regulation forces
a property owner to accept a permanent physical invasion of his
or her property. A recent example is the case of Dolan v. City of
Tigard,63 in which the city of Tigard, Oregon, acting pursuant to a
state land-use plan, adopted an ordinance requiring private prop-
erty owners to set aside portions of their property for public-
access pathways for bikers and pedestrians and greenways to
minimize flooding problems.64 When Mrs. Dolan applied for a
building permit to expand her hardware store, the town condi-
tioned the permit on her setting aside a portion of her property
for a public-access biking and walking pathway.65 She objected,
and argued that conditioning her building permit in such a man-
ner amounted to a regulatory taking.66 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the ability to control access to
one's own property is a key feature of private property ownership,
and forcing her to give up her right to exclude others from her
property amounted to an uncompensated taking under the Fifth
Amendment.67 Rehnquist noted that if the city had used eminent
61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. See id. at 414-16.
63. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
64. See id. at 377-80.
65. See id. at 380.
66. See id. at 382.
67. See id. at 384, 396.
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domain in the classic manner to seize her property for such a
purpose, the city would obviously have owed her just compensa-
tion.68 Under the Constitution, the city could not obtain the same
result by letting her keep fee title to her property, but forcing her
to grant access to the public.69
A second category of regulatory takings has been recognized
when government regulation takes away from the owner all eco-
nomically valuable uses of the property. In the case of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,7" a property owner of beachfront
property suffered the loss of all economic use of his property when
a state coastal management agency issued a regulation prohibit-
ing any development in the zone in which the property was situ-
ated.71 The Court found that this was a regulatory taking on its
face and sent the case back to the South Carolina courts to de-
termine whether it could be justified by the state's own common
law of nuisance. 2
Apart from the two categories of direct physical invasion and
total diminution of economic value, the allegation of a regulatory
taking is complex and difficult to prove. Most cases fall into a
category in which the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City73 offers controlling principles. In Penn Central,
New York City enacted an historic preservation ordinance affect-
ing several hundred distinctive buildings throughout Manhat-
tan.74 Penn Central, which owned Grand Central Station, wanted
to build a fifty-five-story office tower above Grand Central Sta-
tion.7" The city's zoning agency refused to allow Penn Central to
build the office tower on the grounds that such a tower would be
inconsistent with the original architecture of Grand Central Sta-
tion and thus a violation of the city's historic preservation ordi-
nance.7 6 Penn Central offered evidence that it had suffered sev-
eral million dollars in lost revenue because the office tower was
68. See id. at 384.
69. See id. at 396.
70. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
71. See id. at 1006-07.
72. See id. at 1031-32.
73. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
74. See id. at 108-11.
75. See id. at 116-17.
76. See id. at 117.
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not allowed to be built and alleged a regulatory taking.7 The Su-
preme Court, however, refused to find a taking in the city's zon-
ing ordinance or its application to Grand Central Station.7" The
Court reasoned that while Penn Central had clearly lost potential
revenue from being denied the right to develop the office tower,
there was still significant value remaining in the property in its
existing state and thus a taking had not occurred.79
Penn Central established several criteria that are still used by
courts to weigh whether a regulatory taking has resulted from a
government policy. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,s issued in
May 2005, Justice O'Connor, for the Court, described the criteria:
Primary among those factors are "[t]he economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions." In addition, the "character of the governmental action"-for
instance, whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead
merely affects property interests through "some public program ad-justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good" Ibid. [citing Penn Central]. The Penn Central fac-
tors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-
have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory tak-
ings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas
rules.81
In Lingle, the Court made it more difficult to prove a regula-
tory taking. The State of Hawaii enacted a law regulating the
rents charged to oil products retailers who rent their service sta-
tions from oil companies.82 Chevron challenged the law as a regu-
latory taking of its potential rental income stream.83 The lower
courts held that the law violated the Takings Clause, relying on
an earlier Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon,' in
which the Court announced a rule that a regulatory taking would
be found if the state regulation does not substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests,8" which seemed more like a due-process
77. See id. at 116, 119.
78. Id. at 138.
79. See id. at 116, 119.
80. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
81. Id. at 2081-83 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
82. See id. at 2078.
83. See id. at 2078-79.
84. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
85. Id. at 260, quoted in Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2077.
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analysis than a takings test. Indeed, in Lingle, the Court reversed
itself and held that the Agins test was not appropriate under the
Takings Clause. 6 The appropriate test was to evaluate the bur-
den on the property owner by determining whether a direct tak-
ing, a total diminution in value, or a violation of the Penn Central
criteria had taken place, and not to attempt to evaluate whether
the state regulatory policy was an effective means to a legitimate
policy goal."
The Takings Clause and Due Process Clause have been con-
flated before in Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly in
cases involving state regulation of the rates and terms of service
of common carriers and regulated utilities.
In Munn, and in several later Supreme Court cases, privately
owned corporations alleged that state regulatory authorities had
violated the Due Process Clause by limiting their rates to
amounts that did not allow them to recover their costs of provid-
ing the service plus a reasonable rate of return on their investors'
capital.88 In Munn, the Supreme Court refused to question the Il-
linois legislature's determination of reasonable compensation for
operators of grain elevators 9 and said that while legislatures
might well abuse the rate-setting authority, "[fIor protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
not to the courts."90
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions did, in fact, involve the
judiciary in actively determining what constituted reasonable
compensation when state regulatory authorities were challenged
by regulated companies. In Smyth v. Ames,91 just twenty-one
years after Munn, a more conservative Court struck down a Ne-
braska law regulating railroad rates.92 The Court said that the
determination of what constituted reasonable compensation was
not an issue the courts should simply leave to the legislature and
found that Nebraska's railroad rates were so unreasonably low
86. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2087.
87. See id.
88. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 123.
89. See id. at 133-34.
90. Id. at 134.
91. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
92. See id. at 547.
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that they represented a constitutional violation.93 As in Munn,
the regulated company challenged the regulation as a violation of
the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.94 The Court,
however, used the language of the latter Clause in finding a con-
stitutional violation: "The corporation may not be required to use
its property for the benefit of the public without receiving just
compensation for the services rendered by it."95
By the 1920s, the federal courts were deeply into the intricacies
of ratemaking in determining what constituted a reasonable rate
of return. In Bluefield Waterworks Improvement Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,96 the Court set forth a detailed accounting stan-
dard for determining a reasonable rate of return. In that case, it
concluded that six percent, the rate of return on capital allowed
by the state regulatory agency, failed to constitute "just compen-
sation" and was therefore unconstitutional.97 The language of the
Takings Clause again was used in finding a violation of the Due
Process Clause.
The New Deal era produced a return to judicial deference to
rate-making agencies. In Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas,98 in an opinion written by Justice William 0. Doug-
las, one of President Roosevelt's New Deal advisers prior to being
appointed to the Supreme Court by FDR, the Court deferred to
the regulatory agency's determination of a reasonable rate of re-
turn and said even a "meager return" could under certain circum-
stances be just and reasonable and not a constitutional viola-
tion.99
In a more recent electricity-rate case, Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, °° the Supreme Court rejected an allegation of an un-
compensated taking against a Pennsylvania law that "required
that rates for electricity be fixed without consideration of a util-
93. See id. at 526, 547.
94. See id. at 543.
95. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
96. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
97. See id. at 695.
98. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
99. See id. at 605. The Court found no difference between the application of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause to a federal regulatory agency and the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to a state regulatory agency. See id. at 601
(citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 (1942)).
100. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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ity's expenditures for electrical generating facilities which were
planned but never built, even though the expenditures were pru-
dent and reasonable when made."" 1 In upholding the Pennsyl-
vania law against a Takings Clause challenge, the Court dis-
cussed numerous prior cases that were not based on allegations of
Fifth Amendment takings but on alleged violations of the Due
Process Clause, 112 thus incorrectly treating analyses of the two
provisions as virtually identical.' 3 The Court reaffirmed the hold-
ing of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. that
"'[ilf the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unrea-
sonable, judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.""0 4 The Court further
explained that:
whether a particular rate is "unjust" or "unreasonable" will depend
to some extent on what is a fair rate of return given the risks under
a particular rate-setting system, and on the amount of capital upon
which the investors are entitled to earn that return. At the margins,
these questions have constitutional overtones.
10 5
Duquesne Light maintained the trend begun in the 1930s of ju-
dicial deference to legislative or executive agency determinations
of the rates of regulated companies, whether the challenge is
brought specifically under the Takings Clause or as a takings
claim masquerading as a due process violation.
D. The "Dormant Commerce Clause"
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which gives Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce,'0 6 is an affirma-
tive grant of power, which is discussed at length below. When
Congress does not act to regulate a specific area of commerce,
101. Id. at 301.
102. See id. at 307-10 (citing Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578
(1896); Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546; Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605).
103. In Lingle, Justice O'Connor denied that an analysis under the Takings Clause was
identical to an analysis under the Due Process Clause, although she acknowledged that
"there had been some history of referring to deprivations of property without due process
of law as 'takings,' and the Court had yet to clarify whether 'regulatory takings' claims
were properly cognizable under the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause." Lingle,
125 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted).
104. Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 310 (alteration in original) (quoting Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 602).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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however, federal courts have held that the Commerce Clause still
acts as a limit on the regulatory powers of state and local gov-
ernments.
One of the most-cited "dormant Commerce Clause" cases is City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.07 Congress had chosen not to use
its Commerce Clause power to regulate the interstate flow of gar-
bage.' °8 In the absence of any congressional regulation, many
state and local governments had enacted their own laws regulat-
ing the interstate waste trade.'0 9 The State of New Jersey enacted
a law forbidding the importation of garbage generated out of
state."0 Philadelphia, which had contracted with private waste
haulers to deposit much of its municipal garbage in New Jersey
landfills, challenged the New Jersey law as a violation of the
Commerce Clause."'
Even though Congress had not legislated on the interstate gar-
bage issue at all-its power was "dormant-the Court struck
down New Jersey's law as a violation of the Commerce Clause." 2
The Court wrote:
In the absence of federal legislation, these subjects [in which Con-
gress has not acted] are open to control by the States so long as they
act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself.
The bounds of these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the
Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of
this Court ....
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an
alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and protectionism, while
at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate
commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard
the health and safety of its people. Thus, where simple economic pro-
tectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected .... But where other legislative objectives
are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against
interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible ap-
proach .... 113
107. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
108. See id. at 620.
109. See id. at 623.
110. See id. at 618-19.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 629.
113. Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In a "dormant Commerce Clause" case, the Court will look be-
hind the state's use of its police power to determine if the state is
simply engaging in economic protectionism rather than acting in
good faith to protect the health or safety of its citizens." 4 Thus,
state laws banning the importation of diseased livestock or toxic
medical waste may be upheld as legitimate uses of the state's po-
lice power."' In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, however, the
Court saw nothing more than economic protectionism by New
Jersey and struck the law down." 6
The principle that a "dormant Commerce Clause" acts as a
limit on state authority in the absence of congressional action has
been criticized. In a 1997 case, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.
v. Town of Harrison,"7 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, maintained that "[t]he negative
Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution,
makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in appli-
cation."" ' These justices would allow states the maximum author-
ity to exercise their police powers, regardless of the impact on in-
terstate commerce, if Congress has chosen not to use its own
affirmative Commerce Clause power to regulate an area of trade.
These justices expressed a belief that there is no such thing as a
"dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause and Supreme Court
jurisprudence applying a "dormant" Commerce Clause is an im-
proper attempt to create a federal common law when the Consti-
tution explicitly makes the federal government one of enumerated
powers only." 9 This position, while not frivolous given the text of
the Constitution, has not commanded a majority of the Supreme
Court for the past several decades.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 628-29 (explaining that these types of quarantine laws do not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce because they are intended to prevent the flow of harmful
or dangerous items).
116. See id. at 629.
117. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
118. Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 609-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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V. WHAT ARE THE LIMITS ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
REGULATORY POWER?
Since the federal government is not a government of plenary
powers and there is no textual federal police power, the federal
government can regulate only through a direct grant of power
enumerated in the Constitution. At least that was the principle
that James Madison and the other Framers thought they were
embedding in the Constitution. Whether that principle still ap-
plies after recent Supreme Court decisions is questionable.
Certainly the Takings Clause acts as a limit on federal regula-
tory power over privately owned property, in the same way that it
limits state regulatory power. The federal government is also
prevented from acting in a transparently arbitrary or capricious
manner by the due process requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment, 120 although as noted above, since Carolene Products in
1938, the Supreme Court has followed an extremely deferential
standard of judicial review of economic regulation. 2'
The most important enumerated grant of regulatory power to
the federal government is the Commerce Clause. It may accu-
rately be said that the United States Constitution itself came into
existence because of the commercial anarchy and blatant state-
versus-state protectionism that was impoverishing the thirteen
original states during the period immediately following independ-
ence, and the Commerce Clause was intended to solve this prob-
lem. The scope of the commerce power has long been a major
source of constitutional controversy. Clearly it was intended to
give Congress the power to regulate commercial trade that
crossed states lines. Yet how far does the commerce power of
Congress go?
The earliest important case describing the scope of the com-
merce power was Gibbons v. Ogden,'22 in which Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote that ferryboat traffic between New York and
New Jersey constituted interstate commerce and thus was subject
to federal regulation.'23 Yet Marshall also noted that trade which
120. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
122. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
123. See id. at 1.
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was purely within a state would not be subject to federal Com-
merce Clause power.
124
By the latter decades of the nineteenth century, rapid industri-
alization and the criss-crossing of the continent by railroads had
produced an American economy that was truly national in scope.
This rapid industrialization also produced the Progressive Era,
when Congress responded to the problems associated with indus-
trialization with a raft of legislation regulating everything from
railroad rates to child labor to industrial cartels. While Congress
sought to expand dramatically federal regulatory power during
this era, the Supreme Court repeatedly limited it through a nar-
row definition of interstate commerce. In United States v. E.C.
Knight Co. ,125 the Court blocked the federal government from us-
ing the recently enacted Sherman Act 126 to prevent the purchase
of several sugar refineries in Pennsylvania by the American
Sugar Refining Company.'27 The purchases would have cartelized
the national sugar refining industry, but the Court ruled that the
purchases of the refineries did not constitute interstate com-
merce, since the purchase contracts were to be executed in Penn-
sylvania and thus were subject only to the police power of that
state. 121
In the early twentieth century, in the case of Hammer v.
Dagenhart,'29 the Court continued to define interstate commerce
narrowly as it struck down a federal law regulating child labor.
130
The federal law banned the shipment of goods across state lines
that had been manufactured in plants that did not comply with
the federal child labor law. 13' The Court said that while the goods
may cross state lines, what Congress was attempting to regulate
(working hours of children) was local in nature and did not con-
stitute interstate commerce.
132
During the Great Depression the Supreme Court's narrow in-
terpretation of interstate commerce clashed with President
124. See id. at 90.
125. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
127. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 18.
128. See id. at 116-18.
129. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
130. See id. at 276-77.
131. See id. at 268-69.
132. See id. at 276.
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Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. In Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States,"' decided early in FDR's presidency, the
Court struck down a New Deal law establishing minimum wages
and maximum working hours for workers in poultry plants. 34
The Court used the same reasoning as in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
concluding that while some of the chickens processed in
Schechter's plant were shipped across state lines, the wages and
hours of his employees were a local matter and outside the scope
of federal regulatory authority.13 5
Supreme Court decisions such as Schechter Poultry enraged
President Roosevelt and led him early in his second term to pro-
pose what was called his "court-packing" plan, in which he pro-
posed that for every justice on the Supreme Court over the age of
seventy, the President could appoint a new member (at the time
there were six members over seventy).136 Yet even though Con-
gress had an overwhelming majority of FDR's fellow Democrats
in both houses, the plan was not accepted by Congress for fear of
upsetting the basic separation of powers that was a key principle
of the Constitution. The issue became moot, however, as a combi-
nation of retirements and changes in position resulted in a green
light from the Court for virtually all of FDR's New Deal proposals
by the end of Roosevelt's second term.'37
One case from the early 1940s graphically illustrates the
Court's complete reversal on the issue of the scope of the federal
commerce power. In Wickard v. Filburn,"8 federal agricultural
agents penalized a farmer who was growing wheat in excess of a
federally imposed quota.'39 The farmer used the wheat to feed his
own livestock and make flour for his own family's consumption. 140
The wheat was sold to no one, and not only did it not move across
states lines, it literally did not leave his farm.' Yet the Court, in
an opinion written by FDR's former Attorney General, Robert
Jackson, found that federal regulatory power did extend to
Farmer Filburn's wheat growing on the theory that when Farmer
133. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. Id. at 550.
135. See id. at 542-43, 550.
136. See DAAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM C. BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 332-33 (4th ed. 2000).
137. See id. at 334.
138. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
139. See id. at 113.




Filburn grew wheat for his own use, he impacted the national ag-
gregate supply and demand for wheat.14 Thus his wheat produc-
tion, while trivial in quantity and not sold into commerce, was de-
termined to impact interstate commerce sufficiently to justify
federal regulation.'43
Since Wickard, the Supreme Court has never struck down a
federal law regulating economic activity on the grounds that the
law in question exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power-no
matter how minimal or local in nature that economic activity may
be. After Wickard and similar opinions, the federal regulatory
apparatus and reach grew exponentially, leading to today's pleth-
ora of regulatory agencies. 44 All base their authority on the fed-
eral commerce power.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal commerce power was used
to regulate essentially non-economic matters based on congres-
sional findings of the impact of such activities on interstate com-
mercial streams. The Supreme Court upheld the Civil Rights Act
of 196414' as a proper exercise of federal commerce power in
Katzenbach v. McClung,46 and the Court #lso held federal envi-
ronmental laws to be proper exercises of Commerce Clause power
as well. 1
47
By the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court had established three
general categories in which federal regulation based on the
Commerce Clause was authorized:
First... the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second...
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities. Finally . . . to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.148
142. See id. at 127-29.
143. See id. at 127-28.
144. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), to name just a few.
145. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
146. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
147. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 268 (1981).
148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted).
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The first two categories are no longer controversial since they
clearly fit within the text and history of the Commerce Clause.
The third category, however, which has been used to justify fed-
eral regulatory power since the 1940s, is far more controversial
when applied outside the context of economic regulation and to
activities clearly local in nature. By the 1990s, it seemed that the
third category represented the Supreme Court's abandonment of
any effort to define limits on federal regulatory actions claiming a
Commerce Clause basis.
Then, in United States v. Lopez, the Court struck down the
criminal conviction of a youth who had violated a federal law pro-
hibiting bringing guns onto school grounds.149 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a narrow majority, held that the federal
law exceeded Congress's commerce power because the act of
bringing a gun to school did not involve the channels, instrumen-
talities, persons, or things in interstate commerce, nor had Con-
gress demonstrated that the act of bringing a gun to school would
substantially affect interstate commerce. 5 °
A few years later, tlhe Supreme Court struck down provisions of
the federal Violence Against Women Act of 19941 in the case of
United States v. Morrison.'52 In Morrison, a female student at
Virginia Tech alleged that she had been raped in a dorm room by
a member of the Virginia Tech football team.'53 She initiated a
civil action in federal court against Morrison as authorized by the
new federal law.5 4 The Supreme Court, following its reasoning in
Lopez, ruled that the federal law exceeded congressional Com-
merce Clause power.'55 Neither the accused nor the accuser had
used the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
nor did the Court accept that sexual violence of the type alleged
in Morrison had been shown to exert a substantial effect on inter-
149. See id. at 552.
150. See id. at 559, 561.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
152. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
153. See id. at 602.
154. See id. at 604.
155. See id. at 607-18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
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state commerce.156 Thus the Court concluded that this was a mat-
ter purely for the state's general police power, not federal law.'57
Believers in Madisonian principles of federalism cheered both
the Lopez and Morrison decisions, since the Supreme Court was,
for the first time since the 1930s, trying to define some limits to
federal commerce power. Lopez and Morrison appeared to stand
for the proposition that the Court would give Congress essentially
a blank check to regulate purely economic activities, following the
precedent set in Wickard v. Filburn; the Court, however, would
draw lines when Congress went beyond economic regulation and
tried to use the Commerce Clause to justify some types of ex-
tremely broad social regulation, particularly when Congress in-
truded on policy areas historically left to the states. 58 Not coinci-
dentally, both Lopez and Morrison involved education and crime,
two traditional areas of state, not federal, responsibility.
Yet the Commerce Clause element of the Supreme Court's
modern "federalism revolution" was short-lived. In Gonzales v.
Raich,'59 an opinion handed down in June 2005, a six-member
majority of the Supreme Court refused to uphold California's
medical marijuana law against efforts initiated by President
Bush's then-Attorney General John Ashcroft to use the federal
Controlled Substances Act (the "CSA")' 6 ° to override the state
law.' 6 ' The California law, adopted by California voters in a 1996
referendum, allowed persons suffering from painful and debilitat-
ing diseases such as cancer and AIDS to use marijuana for pain
relief with physician approval.'62 The California law fell squarely
within the state's historic police power to protect public health.
The marijuana used for medicinal purposes did not travel across
state lines, but was grown locally and not sold.'63 The Court relied
on Wickard v. Filburn to justify the federal law's negation of the
law enacted by California's citizens.'64 Justice Stevens, for the
156. See id. at 615-16.
157. See id. at 617-18.
158. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
159. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
160. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
161. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 221.
162. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West
Cum. Supp. 2005).
163. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
164. See id. at 2205-07 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
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majority, found that Congress could rationally conclude that
marijuana grown locally for use as prescribed by the California
law could undermine national enforcement of the CSA and could
have a substantial effect on the interstate market for marijuana,
and thus, using the same very deferential standard the Court
used in Wickard, upheld the federal law.'65
Surprisingly, Justice Scalia, given his prior expressions of be-
lief in federalism, voted to allow the federal law to override the
state law, but put forth his reasons in a separate concurrence. 166
Scalia said that the federal law in this case was part of a compre-
hensive nationwide scheme to regulate certain controlled sub-
stances, and under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Con-
stitution, Congress had the power to override state laws that
could frustrate a federal regulatory scheme that was a valid exer-
cise of Commerce Clause power.'67 Scalia distinguished Lopez and
Morrison by saying that the federal laws at issue in those cases
were not proper exercises of federal commerce power, while regu-
lating controlled substances on a national basis was.'68
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, along with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, dissented strongly. 69 O'Connor argued why there
must be limits to federal Commerce Clause power:
We enforce the "outer limits" of Congress' Commerce Clause author-
ity not for their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state
sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to
maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist sys-
tem of government. One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is
that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that "a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."
170
165. See id. at 2207.
166. See id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. See id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . ."). The "foregoing Powers" in-
clude the Commerce Clause power found in Clause 3 of article I, § 8. See id. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
168. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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O'Connor continued, "[tihis case exemplifies the role of States
as laboratories. The States' core police powers have always in-
cluded authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens."'71
O'Connor charged that the Court had rendered Lopez as noth-
ing more than a "drafting guide" for Congress, meaning that all
Congress had to do to justify regulating virtually any activity, no
matter how intrinsically local in nature, was to find that it was
necessary to further a national regulatory scheme. 72
Are there any limits to federal regulatory power using the
Commerce Clause after Gonzales v. Raich? While Justice Scalia,
in his concurrence, insisted there are still limits on that 
power,173
it is hard to determine from the Raich opinion what those limits
realistically might be.
Rather than asking are there still limits to federal Commerce
Clause power, a more important question, perhaps, is should
there be? For the reasons put forth so eloquently in Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Raich, the answer is emphatically yes.
While we must not return to the days when the federal govern-
ment failed to protect the rights of all citizens guaranteed by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments against state denial, un-
der some misbegotten theory of "states' rights," limiting federal
power to pre-empt the states' exercise of their historical policy au-
thority is important for two broad reasons: first, by distributing
powers over several different branches and levels of government
the threat of tyranny is reduced, as James Madison and other
Framers of the Constitution fully understood; and second, allow-
ing states to serve as policy laboratories, in the manner described
by Justice Brandeis, serves the entire nation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding the constitutional framework of economic regu-
lation in the United States requires understanding the intellec-
tual roots of the Founding Fathers' concept of government itself,
the federal structure of government in America, the plenary pow-
171. Id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 2216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ers inherent in the state governments that were inherited from
the British sovereign, and the enumerated nature of federal pow-
ers. The Framers of the United States Constitution were passion-
ate about the protection of individual property rights and the
right of private parties to form and enforce contracts, both rights
essential to the functioning of a market economy, but they did not
intend to enshrine laissez-faire capitalism in the new republic's
basic law. State governments inherited the power to regulate
economic activities from the British sovereign upon independ-
ence, and the Framers considered that power inherent in gov-
ernment. Through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the
Framers gave the federal government an enumerated power of
economic regulation, which most would agree has properly grown
as the American economy has evolved from one essentially local
in nature to one that is national in scope. The Commerce Clause
power, however, has been expanded through Supreme Court opin-
ions such as Gonzales v. Raich beyond economic regulation into
areas of traditional state police-power authority, such as criminal
law, to a degree that clearly exceeds the intention of James Madi-
son and many other Founders of the United States.
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